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INTRODUCTION: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DISRUPTS THE BALANCE
In the aftermath of September 11, the Attorney General
responded to attendant national security concerns by barring the
press from all alien removal proceedings1 that Department of
Justice (DOJ) prosecutors categorize as “special interest.”2
Prosecutors can affix special interest labels in any instance when
they allege that a case poses national security concerns, but they
are not required to justify such categorization to the immigration
judges that preside over these matters.3 Moreover, judges cannot
easily challenge the prosecutors’ decisions,4 and the directive bars
1

The Department of Justice [DOJ] and, until this year, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service [INS] and the Executive Office for Immigration Review [EOIR],
played significant roles in the oversight of those individuals without citizenship in the
United States.
Traditionally, the INS initiated a removal proceeding by alleging that a non-citizen
(“alien”) had committed acts that voided his privilege to remain in the United States. The
INS could prosecute charges of removability against certain individuals who gained
admission into the United States as legal aliens, and against others who either arrived
without acquiring legal status or whose authorized period of stay expired. Immigration
and Nationality Act [INA] § 240(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2003).
The INS presented its allegations before the EOIR, a second division within the DOJ
that oversaw litigation between the INS and the allegedly removable individuals. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2003) (establishing the EOIR).
The EOIR utilized its immigration courts, administered by immigration judges, to
adjudicate such cases. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (outlining the responsibilities of
immigration judges). The EOIR’s Board of Immigration Appeals [BIA] processed
appeals brought by the INS or by respondents. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (detailing the BIA’s
structure).
Since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], however, the
INS has been replaced by the DHS’s Bureau of Immigration and Citizenship Services and
two other DHS bureaus.
2
The Attorney General issued the policy through Chief Immigration Judge Michael
Creppy, the judge within EOIR who oversees the immigration courts. See Memorandum
from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, EOIR, to all Immigration Judges and
Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2002) (introducing this policy), http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf [hereinafter Creppy Directive].
3
See Creppy Directive, supra note 2 (outlining the new policy).
4
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.27, 1003.31, 1003.46. Under the Creppy Directive, the DOJ is
not required to demonstrate to immigration judges why a case should fall within the
special interest category. In May 2002, the Attorney General amended the CFR to allow
the DOJ’s power to submit evidence liberally, which immigration judges must treat as
pertinent to national security. The regulations then require immigration judges to seal
this evidence, and close any hearing that concerns sealed evidence. Id.
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judges from publicizing these cases.5 Recent additions to the
removal procedure also prohibit all parties from discussing such
cases outside of court.6
Rather than implementing the new guidelines, the Attorney
General could have maintained the previous policy that allowed
immigration judges to decide whether to close their own
courtrooms. Before the September 11 changes, these judges—
whose courts are enveloped in the DOJ’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR)—closed their courtrooms only after
determining whether a case’s particular circumstances warranted
such action.7 If the Attorney General had not installed the special
interest procedures, immigration judges could have considered new
security concerns while balancing press freedoms. The Attorney
General’s policy diminishes the discretion of immigration judges,
and it favors the prerogatives of the DOJ prosecutors by granting
the prosecutors decision-making powers without the check of
media supervision.
Two groups of media plaintiffs have sought to enjoin
enforcement of the special interest procedures, but their actions
have yielded mixed results. In cases appealed to the Third and
Sixth Circuits, the plaintiffs contended that, by barring media from
the selected hearings, the DOJ interfered with the press’s right to
observe them on the public’s behalf.8 The plaintiffs grounded their
argument both in First Amendment principle and in the express

5

See Creppy Directive, supra note 2 (stating that immigration courts should not place
information about special interest hearings on their public dockets, nor should they enter
data into a telephone system that provides information to the public on immigration
proceedings).
6
8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(f)(2)(i).
7
Compare 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1997), with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2003).
8
See Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4–5, N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F.
Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J.) (describing the causes of action), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002), http://archive.aclu.org/court/creppy.pdf (last visited May 10, 2003) [hereinafter
North Jersey Complaint]; Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Injunctive and Declarative Relief at
10–12, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (noting,
likewise, the cause of action) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media &
Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Detroit Free Press Complaint].
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language of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).9 In reply, the
DOJ asserted that the nation’s changed circumstances after
September 11 compelled its actions.10 Although the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan and sided with the media plaintiffs,11 the Third Circuit
overturned the U.S. District Court of New Jersey and supported the
DOJ.12 It seems likely that the Supreme Court will grant a writ of
certiorari to resolve the circuit split.
It is important to note that on March 1, 2003, the United States
shifted the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into the
new Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS).13
Three bureaus within the DHS assumed the INS’s responsibilities.
The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) took
on the INS’s immigration benefit services,14 the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) assumed the INS’s
law enforcement functions,15 and the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (BCBP) shouldered aspects of border patrol
formerly under the INS’s purview.16
Despite the INS’s dissolution, the EOIR will continue to
operate as a DOJ agency and will retain its responsibility to

9

North Jersey Complaint, supra note 8, at 4–5; Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra
note 8, at 10–12.
10
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (E.D. Mich.) (noting
that “the subtext” of the government’s argument is its “right to suspend certain personal
liberties in the pursuit of national security”), aff’d, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
11
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
12
N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002).
13
See Philip Shenon, Page Threats and Responses: Domestic Security—Ridge
Discovers Size of Home Security Task, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at A1 (noting that the
government incorporated twenty-two agencies into the DHS).
14
Such services include “the adjudication of family and employment-based petitions;
issuance of employment authorization documents, asylum and refugee processing;
naturalization; and implementation of special status programs such as Temporary
Protected Status.” Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Immigration Service
Transition Will Be Smooth, Agency Says: Offers Reassurances to Immigrants about
Provision of Services (Feb. 26, 2003), http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/
immigration/03022601.htm.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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adjudicate immigration cases.17 After these changes, the BCIS will
initiate these cases, just as the INS had done before.18 The
ramifications of the dissolution remain unclear since the full
transition of responsibilities from the DOJ to the DHS will
probably take over a year.19 Evidence suggests that DOJ initiatives
such as the special interest policy will remain binding until further
notice.20 In fact, the Attorney General signed an order on February
28, 2003, explicitly stating that the DHS will administer certain
regulations formerly under the DOJ’s purview, but that the scope
of these responsibilities will not change.21 For the sake of clarity,
this Note will use the term “INS,” wherever appropriate, when
referring to the agency formerly known by that acronym.
This Note will track the conflict between media interests and
the government, from its origins to its present state. It also will
advocate for restoration of the access policy in place before
September 11. Section I will reveal that before the September 11
attacks, the public enjoyed a presumptive right of public access to
DOJ alien removal proceedings. Section II describes the genesis
and implementation of the special interest procedure, and will
assess the ramifications of an order that redefined the special
interest policy and incorporated it formally into the CFR.22 The
section also chronicles the litigation challenging the procedure,
from district courts to the benches of the Third and Sixth Circuits.
Section III argues for the dissolution of “special interest”
procedures and the restoration of the discretionary power once held
by immigration judges to make case-by-case determinations
regarding press access to their courtrooms. Finally, Section IV
offers the commentary of scholars who have considered the
17

See Florangela Davila, INS Sheds Its Name at Midnight; Agency to Be Under
Homeland Umbrella, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at B1. See also 28 C.F.R. § 200.1
(2003) (stating that the DOJ will retain authority over the EOIR).
18
See Davila, supra note 17.
19
Marisa Taylor & Joe Cantlupe, Homeland Security Nervously Springs to Life, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 1, 2003, at A1.
20
See supra note 14.
21
Aliens and Nationality; Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 9824 (Feb. 28, 2003). This
order shifted regulations formerly found in section 3 of 8 C.F.R. to section 1000. Id. For
example, 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 is now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27.
22
8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2003).
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possible outcome of this debate. Most scholars agree that because
the Supreme Court has not considered a press access case since the
1980s,23 it will be difficult to accurately predict the Court’s
disposition.
I.

BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11, THE PRESS ENJOYED A QUALIFIED
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

The DOJ, a division of the executive branch, traditionally has
overseen immigration matters for the United States that include the
removal of aliens.24 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
authorizes the DOJ, through its Attorney General, to conduct
removal proceedings and to oversee immigration law.25 Through
the INA, Congress has employed its plenary power over
immigration matters and has authorized the DOJ to restrict the
movements of aliens in the United States and to remove them from
America’s shores.26 Congress passed the first version of the INA
in 1952, which consolidated the disparate strands of immigration
and naturalization law then in existence.27 Congress has since
revised the INA, but the 1952 version remains the backbone of
U.S. immigration law.28
Nevertheless, the INA changed rather dramatically29 in 1996,
when President Bill Clinton signed both the Illegal Immigration
23

See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (recognizing the press’
qualified right of access to preliminary hearings, grounded in the First Amendment)
[hereinafter Press-Enterprise II].
24
See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2000) (discussing the power of the Attorney General to
enforce the INA and “all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of
aliens”).
25
Id.
26
See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586–87 (1952) (stating that only as “a
matter of permission and tolerance” can aliens remain in the United States, and that “the
government’s power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this
Court”).
27
MARIAN L. SMITH, Overview of INS History, in A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT (George T. Kurian ed., 1998), available at http://www.immigration.gov/
graphics/aboutus/history/articles/OVIEW.htm (last modified Feb. 28, 2003).
28
Id.
29
See Michael D. Patrick, The Consequence of Criminal Behavior, 220 N.Y.L.J. 18
(1998) (discussing the impact of IIRIRA and AEDPA on aliens).
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Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)30 and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) into law.31 IIRIRA merged formerly distinct deportation
hearings and exclusion proceedings into the removal proceedings
now in operation.32 Deportation hearings dealt with the cases of
those aliens who had gained entry into the United States, whether
legally or illegally, whereas exclusion hearings concerned those
who had not entered the country.33 Today, the INA outlines a
number of grounds under which individuals without citizenship
can be removed from the United States, including: (1)
inadmissibility into the United States;34 (2) violation of the law;35
(3) lack of adherence to a visa’s terms;36 or (4) actions that threaten
national security.37
The EOIR, under the purview of the DOJ, administers removal
proceedings.38 Until the DOJ created the EOIR in 1983,
immigration judges held removal proceedings in immigration
courts within the INS.39 Some questioned whether immigration
judges could be objective within such a structure because the INS
was also a DOJ agency that investigated and prosecuted INA
violations by aliens.40 The creation of the EOIR resolved the
perceived conflict of interest by bringing the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA)41 and the immigration courts within a new quasi-

30

Pub L. No. 104-208 div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3555 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(2000)).
31
Pub L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217, 1220 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244
(2000)).
32
Pub L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3596 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229–30) .
33
Id.
34
8 U.S.C. § 1182.
35
Id. § 1227.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2003) (establishing the EOIR).
39
Id.
40
See LeTourneur v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th
Cir. 1976) (holding that, despite LeTourneur’s challenge, the former immigration court
structure did not violate due process).
41
The Board of Immigration Appeals serves as the chief appellate body within the
immigration system. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review:
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judicial division of the DOJ that operates autonomously from the
former INS.42 The EOIR structure remains in place today, and its
immigration courts provide the forum for the BCIS to litigate cases
it brings against individuals without citizenship. The immigration
courts are scattered across the country, and the Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge, also within the EOIR, administers them.43
All removal proceedings take place under a specific protocol.
To initiate removal, a DOJ representative must file a Notice to
Appear (hereinafter “Notice”)44 to compel an alien’s appearance in
immigration court.45 The Notice must describe a removal
proceeding, and it must list allegations, supported by fact, so that
the accused individual is aware of the statutory provisions he may
have breached.46 After receipt of the Notice, the individual must
stand before an immigration judge at a preliminary court
appearance and affirm or deny the allegations raised by the
government.47 If the person admits to the charges in the Notice,
thereby conceding an INA violation that allows for removal, the
immigration judge accepts this plea and the government will
remove the individual from the United States.48
If the individual intends to challenge the court’s finding of
removability or request a form of relief from removal, the
Board of Immigration Appeals, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last
visited May 10, 2003).
42
8 C.F.R. § 1003.0.
43
The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge oversees the immigration court structure:
The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) provides overall program
direction, articulates policies and procedures, and establishes priorities for more
than 220 Immigration Judges located in 52 Immigration Courts throughout the
Nation. The Chief Immigration Judge carries out these responsibilities with the
assistance and support of two Deputy Chief Immigration Judges and nine
Assistant Chief Immigration Judges.
U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review: Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last visited May
10, 2003).
44
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2003).
45
Id. § (c)(1)(A) (stating that the INA instructs immigration judges to “decide whether
an alien is removable from the United States”).
46
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).
47
8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c).
48
Id.
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immigration judge must allow him to present his case formally in
an individual hearing.49 This hearing is analogous to a trial held
within the judicial branch.
Both parties have a right to
representation, and the government’s counsel is a BCIS-employed
attorney.50 The respondent can choose his own counsel. The
government, however, will not provide an attorney for an indigent
party.51 Both the respondent and the government can present
evidence and the immigration judge and respondent may crossexamine witnesses.52 Under the INA, the former INS53 carries the
burden of proof and must demonstrate “reasonable, substantial, and
probative” evidence that the respondent is removable.54 After each
side presents its case, the immigration judge renders a final
decision.55 Nevertheless, both parties may move for reopening or
reconsideration, or may appeal the immigration judge’s decision to
the BIA.56 After exhausting opportunities for administrative
review, the parties can pursue certain appeals in the Federal Court
of Appeals for the judicial circuit covering the same geographic
region in which the immigration proceedings took place.57
Before the September 11 attacks, the press and the public
enjoyed a qualified right to observe immigration court removal
49

§ 240(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1).
8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(b).
51
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A). See also 8 C.F.R. § 240.10(a)(2) (stating that aliens must
be notified of pro-bono legal resources if they cannot afford representation).
52
Id. § (b)(1), (b)(4)(B). See also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a) (stating that “the duties of the
Service counsel include, but are not limited to, the presentation of evidence and the
interrogation, examination, and cross-examination of the respondent or other witnesses”).
53
Editor’s note: At the time of publication, the INA’s language has not yet been
modified to reflect INS’s incorporation into the DHS.
54
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3)(c)(A).
55
Id. § 1229a(c)(1)(A).
56
See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a) (discussing the procedure for reopening a removal
proceeding). See also id. § 1003.23(b)(1) (noting that an alien or government counsel can
call for reconsideration of an immigration judge’s decision); id. § 1003.1(b)(3) (stating
that the DOJ supervises the BIA, which has jurisdiction over appeals of immigration
court judgments).
The BIA does not ordinarily hold hearings, but bases its decisions on the record of
the immigration court and upon briefs submitted by counsel. Id. §§ 1003.1(e), 1003.3(c),
1003.5. The BIA hears oral arguments only if the petitioner requests such an
opportunity. Id. § 1003.1(e)(7).
57
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2003).
50
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proceedings.58 Although the CFR barred the public from exclusion
hearings, it permitted public attendance at all deportation
hearings.59 It listed several exceptions, however, to this rule.60 It
allowed an immigration judge to limit access in cases of
overcrowding (granting priority to the press) or to protect
“witnesses, parties, or the public interest.”61 The regulations also
compelled an immigration judge to close her courtroom when
handling a case of spousal abuse, unless the allegedly abused
spouse consented to public access, and to close all cases pertaining
to alleged child abuse.62
II.
IN RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11, THE DOJ BARRED PRESS
ACCESS TO SPECIAL INTEREST REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, BUT PRESS
INTERESTS HAVE VEHEMENTLY CHALLENGED THIS POLICY
CHANGE
A. The DOJ Initiated the Special Interest Procedure in Reaction
to the Events of September 11
In response to the tragic loss of life on September 11, various
branches of the government have pursued a War on Terror.63
Among the measures taken, Congress passed the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT

58

8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1997) (current version at 8 C.F.R § 1003.27 (2003)). The C.F.R.
still distinguishes between exclusion and deportation even though the INA no longer does
so in the aftermath of IIRIRA.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. The presumed right of public access did not extend to the BIA before September
11, and does not do so today. The BIA fields its appeals without oral argument unless the
petitioner requests otherwise and the BIA grants this request. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(7).
63
See John Yaukey, Ridge Faces Tough Challenges as Nation’s First Homeland
Security Chief, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 2002, at 8 (quoting President George W. Bush,
“We’re fighting a war against terror with all our resources, and we’re determined to
win.”).
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Act), an omnibus anti-terrorism bill, on October 26, 2001.64 “The
Act makes many changes to criminal, immigration, banking, and
intelligence law” in an effort to streamline investigations related to
terrorism.65 A number of organizations, including the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), have strongly criticized the
measure as an affront to basic freedoms.66 Nevertheless, working
drafts of legislation known as the PATRIOT Act II have begun to
circulate, and, if approved, would further expand law enforcement
powers.67 Other governmental actions have included the military’s

64
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act].
65
David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 966 (2002).
66
See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, USA Patriot Act Boosts Government Powers
While Cutting Back on Traditional Checks and Balances: An ACLU Legislative Analysis
(Nov. 1, 2001) (alleging that the Act erodes the rights of aliens, grants unchecked
surveillance powers to Federal investigators, allows for secret searches, grants the
Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] broad powers to seize business records, and
permits investigations of citizens merely for undefined “intelligence” purposes) (on file
with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
67
On February 7, 2003, the Center for Public Integrity acquired an unpublished draft
copy of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 [hereinafter PATRIOT Act II]
and posted it on its Web site. See Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, Justice Dept. Drafts
Sweeping Expansion of Anti-Terrorism Act: Center Publishes Secret Draft of ‘Patriot II’
Legislation, Center for Public Integrity (Feb. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=502&L1=10&L2=10&L3=0
&L4=0&L5=0.
According to Professor Jack M. Balkin of the Yale Law School, PATRIOT Act II:
would remove existing protections under the Freedom of Information Act,
making it easier for the government to hide whom it is holding and why, and
preventing the public from ever obtaining embarrassing information about
government overreaching.
Another section would nullify existing consent decrees against state law
enforcement agencies that prevent the agencies from spying on individuals and
organizations. . . .
Perhaps the most troubling section would strip U.S. citizenship from anyone
who gives “material support” to any group that the [A]ttorney [G]eneral
designates as a terrorist organization. . . . Under our Constitution, Americans
can’t be deprived of their citizenship, and the rights that go with it, unless they
voluntarily give it up.
The measure would get around that constitutional guarantee through a legal
loophole. It presumes that anyone who provides “material support” to an
organization on the [A]ttorney [G]eneral’s blacklist—even if that support is
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detention of alleged “enemy combatants” at the United States
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,68 battles with
Afghanistan’s Taliban regime,69 war with Iraq,70 and the creation
of the Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.71
As an executive branch agency, the DOJ also joined in efforts
to prosecute the War on Terror, and, to this end, established new
procedures for special interest removal proceedings. At the request
of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Chief Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy released a notice (hereinafter the “Creppy
Directive”) to all immigration judges on September 21, 2001.72
The Creppy Directive informed immigration judges that the DOJ
otherwise lawful—has intended to relinquish citizenship and therefore may be
immediately expatriated.
Jack M. Balkin, Editorial, Commentary: A Dreadful Act II: Secret Proposals in
Ashcroft’s Anti-Terror War Strike Yet Another Blow at Fundamental Rights, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2003, at B23.
68
See Mary Jacoby, Safety and Rights in the Balance, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),
Sept. 16, 2002, at 1A.
69
See Warren P. Strobel, U.S., Iran Exchange Ideas over Iraq, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 1,
2002, at 3.
70
Id.
71
Richard W. Stevenson, Threats and Responses: The President; Signing Homeland
Security Bill, Bush Appoints Ridge as Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov, 26, 2002, at A1.
72
The document states, in pertinent part:
Immigration Courts are beginning to receive cases for which the [DOJ] is
requiring special arrangements.
The following procedures are being followed for these cases: . . .
3. Each of these cases is to be heard separately from all other cases on the
docket. The courtroom must be closed for these cases—no visitors, no
family, and no press.
4. The Record of Proceeding is not to be released to anyone except an attorney
or representative who has . . . [EOIR clearance] on file for the case
(assuming the file does not contain classified information). . . .
5. This restriction on information includes confirming or denying whether
such a case is on the docket or scheduled for a hearing. . . .
6. [I]nformation about the case [shall not be] provided on the 1-800 number
and the case [shall not be] listed on the court calendars posted outside the
courtrooms
....
8. Finally, you should instruct all courtroom personnel, including both court
employees and contract interpreters, that they are not to discuss the case
with anyone.
Creppy Directive, supra note 2.
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would label certain removal proceedings as special interest, by
alleging that the individuals facing removal possessed ties to
terrorist activities.73
The Creppy Directive also advised
immigration judges that the DOJ prohibited the press and public’s
attendance at such special interest proceedings, and it prevented
immigration judges from publicizing the proceedings.74 By
closing special interest hearings without first allowing immigration
judges to weigh evidence and make determinations on a case-bycase basis, media interests have argued that the Creppy Directive
directly infringes on their rights to attend such proceedings as the
eyes and ears of the public.
B. The Attorney General Reinforced the Creppy Directive with an
Order
Despite criticism brought by media interests against the Creppy
Directive, Attorney General Ashcroft codified and expanded its
principles by crafting an order that amended 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 and 8
C.F.R. §§ 3.31(d) and added 3.46.75 Because of the Attorney
General’s order that relocates portions of the CFR to accommodate
the DHS,76 these regulations now are found in section 1000, as 8
C.F.R. §§ 1003.27, 1003.31, and 1003.46. The immediately
enforceable changes both codified the Creppy Directive’s
provisions and expanded upon them.77
The addition to section 1003.31 permits the government to
present documents of its choosing to an immigration judge, under
73

Id.
Id.
75
Protection Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36799,
36799 (May 28, 2002) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.27, 3.31 and adding 3.46 (2002)).
76
8 C.F.R. § 200.1.
77
See Protection Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg.
36799, 36799 (May 28, 2002) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.27, 3.31 and adding 3.46 (2002)).
On July 16, 2002, Chief Immigration Judge Creppy released a second memorandum for
those affiliated with immigration courts. It provided instructions regarding enforcement
of the new regulatory language, and it clarified the manner in which the new language
bolstered his memorandum of September 21, 2001. See Memorandum from Michael J.
Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, EOIR, to All Immigration Judge[s], All Court
Administrators, All Judicial Law Clerks, and All Immigration Court Staff (July 16,
2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm02/OPPM02-02.pdf.
74
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seal.78 Section 1003.46 gives that judge little leeway to bar
admittance of such documents. Its language compels the judge to
defer to the government’s contentions that the information it seals
is both relevant and potentially injurious to national security.79
Section 1003.46 also allows the government to preclude the
respondent and her counsel from viewing such documents.80 As a
result, immigration judges may receive one-sided arguments,
which could lead them to bar the press from hearings that should
have remained open.
Once an immigration judge admits sealed information, section
1003.46 compels her to release a protective order, which can
prohibit respondents and their attorneys from sharing protected
information without the permission of the government or the
immigration judge. If a respondent or her counselor breaches a
protective order, the immigration judge must deny all forms of
discretionary relief to the respondent, except bond, and may bar the
counselor from appearing before the EOIR or before other
government agencies handling immigration claims.81
Protective orders implicate press interests because the revised
section 1003.27 bars the press and public from any hearings with
protected evidence.82 Moreover, because section 1003.46 renders
protective orders permanently enforceable unless immigration
judges vacate them, members of the media may be barred from
ever reporting on cases that involved sealed documents.83
Previously, if the press had been prohibited from a courtroom
handling a special interest matter, reporters could contact
respondents or their attorneys to learn about the events within the
78

8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(d).
Id. § 1003.46.
80
Id.
81
Id. § 1003.46(i).
82
Id. § 1003.27(d).
83
Id. § 1003.46(f). See also Jim Edwards, As Judge Enjoins Blanket Secrecy, U.S.
Adopts Rules for Closed Deport Hearings—Provides for Protective Orders and Sanctions
for Lawyers Who Flout Them, 168 N.J.L.J. 828 (2002) (“There is no time limit or
expiration date once a protective order sealing a case is handed down. . . . [A] journalist
wanting to research the story of Sept. 11 decades from now would have to go back to
court to get the order lifted.”).
79
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courtroom.84 Such contact provided the press with some insight
into the nature of these proceedings and the press could share this
information with the public.85 As a result of the changes to the
CFR, reporters can no longer consult any participant in a special
interest case without subjecting such persons to stiff penalties.86
Attorney General Ashcroft offered a number of reasons for
codifying the expanded special interest procedure despite its
restrictions on the press. Among them, he stressed that while
particular disclosures in the hearings might seem innocuous on
their own, individuals seeking to harm the United States can
cluster such fragments of intelligence into a mosaic of dangerous
information.87 Ashcroft then argued that the changes passed
constitutional muster because he believes they are no greater “than
is necessary or essential to protect” the “important and substantial
governmental interest in safeguarding the public, and national
security and law enforcement concerns.”88 Thus, the Attorney
General asserted that the restrictions were designed to protect
national security interests and that they did not unnecessarily
interfere with First Amendment principles.89

84

See Edwards, supra note 83.
Id.
86
Id.
87
Protective Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36799,
36799–36800 (May 28, 2002) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.27, 3.31 and adding 3.46).
88
Id. at 36800.
89
The Attorney General chose language evocative of the content neutrality test
developed by the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for
determining when a regulation intended to control conduct can interfere permissibly with
protected speech:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Id. at 377.
85
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C. Since the DOJ Implemented the Creppy Directive, It Has
Sought to Remove Hundreds of Aliens by Using Special
Interest Procedures
Since the Creppy Directive established special interest
procedures on September 21, 2001, the DOJ has relied on them
with regularity. Recently, the DOJ revealed that more than 600
removal proceedings have been conducted under special interest
guidelines.90 The DOJ also confirmed that it had detained many
more aliens than previously publicized.91 Despite the DOJ’s
attempts to curtail public knowledge of special interest proceedings
and related arrests, numerous stories have surfaced in recent
months of aliens who have been detained by the DOJ for months at
a time, without formal charges,92 and who have then faced special
interest proceedings once the DOJ charged them with removable
offenses. Some aliens have discussed their experiences openly,93
90

On July 3, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Daniel Bryant crafted a letter in
response to an inquiry by Senator Carl Levin, Democrat-Michigan, chair of the Senate’s
permanent subcommittee on investigations, regarding specifics of the special interest
practice. Bryant noted that, as of May 29, 2002, 611 of 752 people detained by the INS
as part of the DOJ’s investigations on terrorism had been the subjects of special interest
hearings. Bryant added that the INS had retained custody of eighty-one individuals. See
Tamara Audi, U.S. Held 600 for Secret Rulings, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 18, 2002.
To contextualize the prevalence of the special interest proceedings, immigration
judges handled more than 127,000 matters during the 1984 fiscal year, and more than
284,000 matters during the 2001 fiscal year. Executive Office for Immigration Review
Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2002) (statement of Kevin D. Rooney,
Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review).
91
See Matthew Brzezinski, Hady Hassan Omar’s Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 50 (noting that the DOJ regularly concealed the identities and
locations of those individuals it detained during round-ups following the September 11
attacks).
92
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from
the United States.”); Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50 (citing Bill Strassberger, a
spokesperson for the former INS, stating that the government may enforce such
detentions for “reasonable” periods in cases it labels “emergencies”). See also Custody
Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) and
codifying the language that Strassberger describes). In practice, however, the policy “has
been to lock up first, ask questions later.” Cole, supra note 65, at 964.
93
See, e.g., Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50 (detailing Hady Hassan Omar’s
experiences while being investigated for alleged ties to terrorists).
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while the stories of others surfaced when members of the press and
public discovered specific removal proceedings.94
The story of Hady Hassan Omar may be typical of the
experiences faced by aliens who were detained without formal
charges, but then faced closed special interest proceedings. Omar,
an Egyptian national with an American wife and daughter, lives in
Fort Smith, Arkansas.95 On September 12, 2001, Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) agents came to his home and took him in for
questioning.96 Although they did not disclose it initially, they
wanted to know why Omar had used a Kinko’s computer in
Florida to purchase an airline ticket.97 Mohammed Atta, the
alleged leader of the September 11 hijackers, used the same
computer within hours of Omar to purchase a ticket of his own.98
Although the FBI did not charge Omar with a crime, its agents
transferred custody of Omar to the INS, which then held Omar
temporarily at one of its detention centers.99 Shortly thereafter, the
INS moved him to a New Orleans prison.100 Omar says he
remained in solitary confinement for months, often shackled, and
that he faced numerous interrogations pertaining to his alleged
involvement in terrorist activities.101 The government never
charged Omar with a crime during this period of detention.
Nevertheless, the government levied immigration charges; Omar
received a Notice, in which the DOJ accused him of arranging his
first marriage merely to secure residency in the United States.102

94

See Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra note 8, at 4–6 (describing the substantial
publicity surrounding the arrest of Rabih Haddad and the failed attempts of the press and
public to attend his removal hearings); North Jersey Complaint, supra note 8, at 2–4
(mentioning that immigration judges had barred numerous reporters from immigration
courts to enforce the special interest policy).
95
Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
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These accusations led to a closed special interest hearing
before an immigration judge.103 The immigration judge freed
Omar on a $5,000 bond, but government counsel appealed,104
forcing Omar back into custody.105 After more than two months of
imprisonment, and Omar’s threats of suicide, the INS finally
released Omar on November 20, 2001, but the INS is pursuing
Omar’s removal based on the alleged impropriety of his first
marriage.106
A second well-publicized special interest case involves Rabih
Haddad, a Lebanese national who is a community and religious
leader in Ann Arbor, Michigan.107 Haddad also co-founded the
Global Relief Foundation (hereinafter the “Foundation”), an
Islamic charity.108 He has lived in Ann Arbor for various periods
since 1988 and resides with his Kuwaiti wife and their four
children.109 On December 14, 2001, INS officers arrested Haddad
at his home for overstaying the six-month tourist visa that had
allowed him legal entry into the United States, but which had
lapsed in August 1999.110 On that same day, under the authority of
103

Id.
Id.
105
Under a new regulation promulgated by an Executive Order, the INS “can keep the
alien locked up simply by filing an appeal of the release order.” Cole, supra note 65, at
965 (citing Review of Custody Determinations, Interim Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909 (Oct.
31, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3)).
106
Other Muslim aliens have endured similar treatment, such as Shakir Baloch, a
Canadian citizen of Pakistani origin. He was detained for more than six months before
his return to Canada. Anser Mehmood was arrested in September 2001, but not formally
charged until March 2002. He was detained in an isolation cell with 24-hour lighting.
See Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50.
107
See Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra note 8, at 4.
108
Id.
109
Id. See Nat’l Pub. Radio, NPR Special Report: Muslims in America-Part Three:
Middle East Heritage in America’s Heartland (Nov. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/response/home_front/features/2001/nov/muslim/01110
5.muslim.html. Haddad’s family contributes to the population of more than 250,000
people of Arab descent who live in southeastern Michigan, comprising the world’s third
largest Arab community. Many of these individuals are American citizens, but a number,
like Haddad, are resident aliens. Id.
110
See David Ashenfelter & Niraj Warikoo, Free Press Files Suit in Haddad Case:
Newspaper Sues to Open Hearing, BRADENTON HERALD (Fla.), Oct. 3, 2002, at 9. See
also Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that in April 2001, Haddad
104
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the PATRIOT Act, the Treasury Department froze the
Foundation’s assets.111 The DOJ alleges that the Foundation
covertly funded activities of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, yet
Haddad has not been formally charged with a crime.112 The DOJ
initiated closed special interest removal proceedings against
Haddad for violating his immigration status and has detained him
since his arrest.113 An immigration judge recently denied Haddad
the asylum he sought in order to reacquire legal status in the
United States.114 He remains imprisoned, pending the outcome of
his appeal to the BIA regarding his asylum application.115
Although the stories of Hady Hassan Omar and Rabih Haddad
exemplify the dramatic impact of special interest procedures on
certain individuals, the special interest policy has also affected
press interests. Members of the press have been forced to rely
primarily on incomplete information to chronicle the experiences
of special interest respondents.116 Thus, the press asserts that the
policy has impinged upon the protected freedoms that its members
enjoy in the United States, rendering it unable to fulfill its mission
to inform the public effectively about the substance of these
hearings.117 As a result, two groups of newspaper plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the DOJ’s use of special interest procedures.118 They did

had applied for full-time residency status). Haddad’s lapsed visa placed him in violation
of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2003).
111
See Kim Kozlowski & David Shepardson, Ramadan Donors Struggle to Find
Approved Charities; Some Groups Have Assets Frozen in Terrorism Probe, DETROIT
NEWS, Nov. 7, 2002, at 1E.
112
See Sarah Freeman, Man Denies Aiding Al-Qaeda and Asks for U.S. Asylum, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Oct. 24, 2002, at A16.
113
Id.
114
Matt O’Connor & Rudolph Bush, 2 Court Rulings Go Against Leaders of Muslim
Charities, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2002, at N15.
115
See id.
116
See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 684–85 (6th Cir. 2002)
(noting the obstacles that media entities faced when trying to gather facts on Haddad’s
case).
117
See id.
118
Id.; see also N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 203–04 (3d Cir.
2002) (describing the press’s collective preference for case-by-case determinations).
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not argue for blanket access to immigration courtrooms.119
Instead, the press sought to restore the power of immigration
judges to make case-by-case determinations regarding press
attendance at such proceedings, thus reestablishing a qualified
right of press access predicated on a balancing of interests.120
D. Media Plaintiffs Have Sought to Enjoin Enforcement of the
DOJ’s Special Interest Policy by Securing Injunctions from
Judicial Branch Courts
1. Two Federal Cases Have Challenged the Special Interest
Policy
Press plaintiffs in Michigan and New Jersey filed suit to
reinstitute the qualified right of press access to removal
proceedings restricted by the Creppy Directive.121 In each case,
the plaintiffs argued that both federal regulations and the First
Amendment guaranteed press the right to observe such matters,
unless an immigration judge could find case-specific reasons to
close a removal proceeding.122
In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the publisher of two
northern New Jersey daily newspapers joined the New Jersey Law
Journal in a suit filed with the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey.123 The plaintiffs sought a nationwide injunction to
bar implementation of the special interest procedures.124 Although
119

Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684, 692–93; N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at
203–04.
120
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684, 692–93; N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at
203–04.
121
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941–42 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288
(D.N.J.), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). The two cases commenced before the
Attorney General issued his order that revised the CFR. As a result, they do not comport
with these changes. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered the new provision, whereas
the Third Circuit ignored it. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681; N. Jersey Media
Group, 308 F.3d 198.
122
See Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra note 8, at 11–12 (describing the causes of
action); North Jersey Complaint, supra note 8, at 4–5 (describing the causes of action).
123
N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
124
North Jersey Complaint, supra note 8, at 5.
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the District Court held for the plaintiffs and granted the
injunction,125 the Third Circuit reversed and held for the DOJ.126
Plaintiffs in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft127 sought collectively to
enjoin enforcement of the Creppy Directive strictly as it related to
Rabih Haddad’s proceedings; each of the media plaintiffs had been
barred from Haddad’s removal proceedings because of special
interest considerations.128 Both the U.S. District Court of the
Eastern District of Michigan129 and the Sixth Circuit130 sided with
the plaintiffs, enjoining the closure of Haddad’s hearings through
use of special interest procedures. Nevertheless, the immigration
judge currently presiding over Haddad’s hearings has continued to
block public access.131
2. Press Interests Have Relied Both on Regulatory Language
and the Richmond Newspapers Test to Ground their
Arguments
The plaintiffs relied on two different sources of law to pursue
their claims. They argued that neither the CFR, nor the First
Amendment allowed for special interest procedures. To support
their CFR argument, the media plaintiffs contended that the special
interest procedures of the Creppy Directive were incompatible with
the qualified right of access outlined in the regulation.132 To

125

N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 305–06.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221.
127
The plaintiffs were the Detroit Free Press, Inc. and Herald Co., Inc., Detroit News,
Inc., and Metro Times, Inc. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684 n.3.
128
Id. (stating that the three media plaintiffs filed separate suits that were consolidated
before trial). Joining them, as well, were Haddad and Representative John Conyers,
Democrat-Michigan, ranking member of the Judiciary Committee in the House of
Representatives, who was barred from attending Haddad’s immigration court hearings.
Id. at 684.
129
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
130
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710.
131
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-70339, 2002 WL 31317398, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Oct. 7, 2002). The same immigration judge recently denied Haddad’s asylum claim, thus
making him eligible for removal under the INA because he has overstayed his visa.
132
Plaintiffs turned specifically to the language of 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1997)—the version
in place before the Attorney General’s 2002 revisions. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp.
126
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pursue the constitutional portion of their arguments, both plaintiffs
relied on the same collection of case law, Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia and its progeny.133
In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court first articulated a
generalized test to determine whether the First Amendment grants
the press presumed rights to observe particular court
proceedings.134 Since then, the Court has granted such rights to
media in a number of contexts.135 Six years after Richmond
Newspapers, in the second of two significant cases entitled PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press-Enterprise II”), Chief
Justice Warren Burger consolidated the measures relied upon in
the previous press access cases and established the two-pronged
“experience and logic” test.136 The experience prong calls on a
court to consider whether “the place and process have historically
been open to the press and general public.”137 Under the logic
prong, a court must examine
whether public access plays a significant positive role in
the functioning of the particular process in question. . . .
Although many governmental processes operate best under
public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that
there are some kinds of government operations that would
be totally frustrated if conducted openly.138

2d at 941; N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290 (D.N.J.), rev’d,
308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
133
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also PressEnter. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]; PressEnterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
134
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581.
135
In Richmond Newspapers, the Court confirmed the qualified public access right to
attend criminal trials. 448 U.S. at 581. In Globe Newspaper, the Court held statutes
calling for automatic closure of courtrooms unconstitutional. 457 U.S. at 610–11. In
Press-Enterprise I, the Court held that the voir dire portion of jury selection must be
presumptively open. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513. Finally, in Press-Enterprise II,
the Court extended the qualified press access right to preliminary trial proceedings.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 15.
136
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9.
137
Id. at 8.
138
Id. at 8–9 (citations omitted).
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Press access can arise only if a given proceeding passes both of the
test’s prongs.139 The Supreme Court limits the access test, noting
that even if a proceeding fulfills both of the prongs, the rights of
the accused or other parties could be “undermined by publicity” in
certain circumstances.140 In such individual cases, Chief Justice
Burger notes, the trial court must “determine whether the situation
is such that the rights . . . override the qualified First Amendment
right of access.”141
In the cases before the district courts in Michigan and New
Jersey, the plaintiffs asserted that the Richmond Newspapers test
was the appropriate measure to assess access rights to removal
proceedings.142 Further, they implied that the government’s
special interest procedures failed to overcome a presumption of
access because they could not satisfy the traditional test of strict
scrutiny,143 lacking a narrowly tailored compelling governmental
objective.144

139

See id. at 9 (“If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of experience
and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches.”).
140
Id.
141
Id. The Court specified:
[T]he presumption of [access] may be overcome only by an overriding interest
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the
closure order was properly entered.
Id. at 9–10.
142
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941–42 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d,
303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288,
298 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
143
Courts apply traditional strict scrutiny when employing the Richmond Newspapers
test because of the Supreme Court’s indication in Globe Newspaper that such an
approach is appropriate. See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (citing
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07).
The U.S. District Court for the District of Michigan also distinguished the application of
strict scrutiny from application of the standard used in U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), in cases that implicate the Richmond Newspapers test:
As the Sixth Circuit explained in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710
F.2d at 1179, there are two broad categories of exceptions to the practice of
openness in the courtroom: those based on the need to keep order and dignity in
the courtroom and those which center on the content of the information to be
disclosed to the public. The first category may only need to pass the O’Brien
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3. Media Plaintiffs Win the First Legal Challenge
In Michigan, media plaintiffs secured their first victory in the
battle to restore qualified access to special interest removal
proceedings. On April 3, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan granted a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the DOJ from closing Rabih Haddad’s hearings via
enforcement of the Creppy Directive.145 The court first determined
that the Richmond Newspapers line of cases applied to removal
proceedings,146 and also found that removal proceedings pass the
experience and logic test.147 Thereafter, it determined that the
Creppy Directive was not narrowly tailored as a legitimate
exception to the expectation of openness.148 As such, the court
found that closure of Haddad’s hearings violated the First
Amendment, and the court ordered Haddad’s hearings reopened.149
In making the initial determination to use the Richmond
Newspapers test, the Michigan court considered it important that
the Sixth Circuit applied the test to analyze a separate press access
claim.150 Once committed to the Richmond Newspapers test, the
test; however, as to the second category, “only the most compelling reasons”
can justify closure.
Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 945 n.8 (citation omitted).
144
See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47 (detailing the court’s application
of the strict scrutiny standard to the facts). See also N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp.
2d at 301–02 (providing similar analysis).
145
Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 948. The court considered the following four
factors when deciding to apply a preliminary injunction: “(1) whether the movant has a
strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer
irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would
cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether public interest would be served by
issuance of the injunction.” Id. at 942 (citing Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 809 (6th
Cir. 2001)).
146
Id. at 942. The court opted to separate the plaintiff’s claim under the CFR from its
First Amendment analysis; instead, the court incorporated the CFR’s language into its
analysis of the Richmond Newspapers’ experience prong. Id. at 943.
147
Id. at 943–44.
148
Id. at 946–47.
149
Id. at 947–48.
150
Id. at 942. The Sixth Circuit used the test when assessing whether newspapers could
challenge closure of a summary jury proceeding. “First the proceeding must be one for
which there has been a ‘tradition of accessibility”“ and “[s]econd, public access must
play a ‘significant positive role’ in the function of the particular process in question.” Id.
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court then established that removal proceedings historically
operated under a clear presumption of openness.151 The court
remarked that while exclusion hearings have been closed expressly
by statute and regulation, deportation hearings have never been
addressed in federal statute and that “INS regulations for almost
fifty years have mandated that deportation proceedings be
presumptively open.”152
The court then turned to the logic prong of the Richmond
Newspapers test, noting that, “when governmental agencies
adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect
the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies
use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with
the judicial process.”153 The court added that open removal
proceedings, “especially those in which the life or liberty of an
individual is at stake, should be subject to public scrutiny, not only
for the protection of the individual from unwarranted and arbitrary
conviction, but also to protect the public from lax prosecution.”154
Because Haddad’s right to remain in the United States would be
decided in the removal proceedings, the court found it logically
imperative to keep immigration courts presumptively open.155
at 942 (citations omitted) (quoting Cincinnati Gas and Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854
F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir 1988)).
151
Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
152
See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 943. Although Haddad’s case has
unfolded in the aftermath of the IIRIRA, courts have continued to distinguish between
those cases that would have fit within the deportation category and those that would have
been exclusion hearings. Haddad’s hearing clearly falls into the deportation category
because Haddad had acquired legal status in the United States by way of the visa that he
overstayed, and he had established residency.
153
Id. at 943–44 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
154
Id. at 944 (quoting Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 117–18 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
155
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). The court noted:
It is important for the public . . . to know that even during these sensitive times
the Government is adhering to immigration procedures and respecting
individuals’ rights. . . . [S]ecrecy only breeds suspicion as to why the
government is proceeding against Haddad and aliens like him. And if in fact
the Government determines that Haddad is connected to terrorist activity or
organizations, a decision made openly concerning his deportation may assure
the public that justice has been done.
Id. at 944.
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After determining that removal proceedings satisfied both
prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test, the court then decided
that the government could not fit the Creppy Directive within the
test’s exception that allows for narrowly tailored measures that
fulfill compelling governmental objectives.156 The court first
found that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling
governmental objective because it spoke only in generalities about
the potential terror threats that would arise by opening Haddad’s
hearing.157 The court then concluded that the government’s effort
to protect the courtroom was ineffective because attorneys and
clients could discuss matters outside of the courtroom,158 and
because the press already had reported extensively upon the
case.159 Therefore, the Creppy Directive failed the narrow
tailoring requirement.160 As a result, the Michigan court held that
the immigration court must open Haddad’s hearings.161
4. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
Grants the Media Plaintiffs a Second Significant Victory
Shortly after the Michigan court issued its injunction, the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey also enjoined
implementation of the Creppy Directive,162 but its analysis differed
156

Id. at 947. The government did not concede that the Creppy Directive could apply
only if it was narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling governmental interest (the strict
scrutiny measure). Id. at 944–47. The court, however, did not support this stance. Id. at
947.
157
Id. at 946–47.
158
Id. at 947. The Attorney General incorporated language into 8 C.F.R. § 3.46 (1997)
(current version at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2003)) to close this loophole.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 947–48. After the District Court denied reconsideration on April 3, 2002, the
government appealed to the Sixth Circuit for a stay, pending appeal. Id. at 948. It granted
a temporary stay, but dissolved it shortly thereafter while denying the government’s
motion for stay pending appeal. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-1437 (6th Cir.
Apr. 10, 2002), at 2002 WL 1332827; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-1437
(6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2002), at 2002 WL 1332836.
162
N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 308
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). The court required that the plaintiffs meet a slightly different
standard for an injunction than that employed in Detroit Free Press:
(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the
merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the
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significantly from that of the Michigan court. In New Jersey, the
court dealt separately with the plaintiffs’ causes of action under the
First Amendment and the CFR,163 whereas Michigan’s court
combined the two issues.
As in Detroit Free Press, the court first concluded that the
Richmond Newspapers test applied to this case, and then used the
test to determine that a First Amendment right of access had been
infringed upon by the special interest policy.164 The New Jersey
court found it significant that other courts had used the test in noncriminal contexts.165 The court then considered the facts before it
in terms of experience and logic. As for the experience prong, the
court traced qualified openness in removal proceedings to
Yamataya v. Fisher,166 which guaranteed non-citizens due process

relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to
the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in
the public interest.
Id. at 296 (citing Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999)).
The court will issue an injunction only if all four prongs are met. See id. (citing Merchant
Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 628, 632–33 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting
Opticians Ass’n v. Indep. Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990))).
163
See id. at 302–04. Still, as in the Michigan case, the court also used the CFR to
bolster its experience prong analysis under the Richmond Newspapers test. Id. at 300.
164
Id. at 298–302.
165
Id. at 299–300. In deciding that the Richmond Newspapers line applied, the court
also stressed that the experience and logic test has been employed in settings other than
criminal court:
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (extending
Richmond Newspapers rationale to civil trials); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. W.
Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying test to find right of
access to municipal planning meeting); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of
Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying test to administrative voter
list); Soc’y of Prof. Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D.
Utah 1985) (applying test to administrative hearing).
Id. at 300.
Nevertheless, the government suggested that the “facially legitimate and bona fide”
standard of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972), provided the proper
measure because Congress has plenary power over immigration matters. Yet, the New
Jersey court distinguished Kleindienst because it pertained to an individual who had not
yet entered the United States, and thus was not afforded the due process rights granted to
those already in the United States. N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 296–98.
166
189 U.S. 86 (1903).

OBERFIELD FORMAT

2003]

DOJ PROCEEDINGS INFRINGE PRESS LIBERTIES

8/27/03 3:00 PM

1237

when facing removal.167 As for the logic prong, the court noted
that:
deportation proceedings inherently involve a governmental
process that affects a person’s liberty interest[.] . . . Thus,
the ultimate individual stake in these proceedings is the
same as or greater than in criminal proceedings or civil
actions[, and] . . . the same functional goals served by
openness in the civil and criminal judicial contexts would
be equally served in the context of deportation hearings.168
After concluding that the Richmond Newspapers test applies to
removal proceedings that pertain to deportation, the court
concluded that the Creppy Directive lacked the narrow tailoring
necessary to fulfill a compelling governmental interest.169 As
such, the government could not overcome the presumption of
openness tied to the proceedings.170 The court divided the
government’s interests into two pools: “(1) avoidance of setbacks
to its terrorism investigation caused by open hearings; and (2)
prevention of stigma or harm to detainees that might result if
hearings were open.”171 The court did not directly assess whether
these interests met the compelling interest standard,172 but focused
instead on the narrow tailoring requirement.173 Echoing the
Michigan court’s analysis in Detroit Free Press, the court found
167

See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 300 (highlighting that the CFR’s
consistent call for presumptively open removal proceedings since 1964, added further
substance to the experience analysis).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 301–02.
171
Id. at 301.
172
Id. at 301–02. Essentially, the court merged its analysis of the government’s
objectives and the Creppy Directive’s tailoring. As such, the court neglected to weigh the
first prong of the government’s burden at all, and only alluded to the flaws of the
government’s attempt to meet their second prong burden within its commentary on
tailoring. Id.
173
Id. The court implied that if the government had allowed for case-by-case in camera
review of allegedly sensitive information, the government would have fulfilled the
narrow tailoring requirement. Nevertheless, because the court does not make clear
whether both of the government’s interests were compelling, one cannot discern whether
the government could have satisfied the strict scrutiny test if it had adopted the case-bycase approach. Id.

OBERFIELD FORMAT

1238

8/27/03 3:00 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1209

that because the respondents and lawyers could speak openly about
removal proceedings outside the court, the Creppy Directive
lacked sufficient narrowness.174 The court further noted that, “to
the extent that the Creppy [Directive] is said to serve the interest of
insulating the individual detainee from humiliation or stigma,” it
exhibits excessive breadth because it prohibits respondents from
keeping their proceedings open if that is what they would prefer.175
Nevertheless, after the court dismissed the government’s
special interest policy on First Amendment grounds, it held that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an access right through strict
reliance on the CFR.176 The court stated that, “neither the
regulations themselves nor their enabling statutes expressly
provide a right of enforcement through a civil action for perceived
violations.”177 Specifically, the court deferred to Alexander v.
Sandoval,178 where the Supreme Court disallowed third parties
from enforcing regulations when Congress has not created such a
right.179 Without a “‘freestanding’ cause of action” drafted for
their use, the plaintiffs stood powerless to enforce the qualified
access right that the regulations permitted.180 Therefore, even
though the court thought it appropriate to refer to the CFR in its
Richmond Newspapers analysis, it would not affirm a right of
access grounded in the public’s enforcement of regulatory
language.181
Yet the court granted the plaintiffs the injunction they sought
because it concluded that a First Amendment calculus requires
presumptive openness for removal proceedings, and that the
174

Id. at 301 (noting accord with Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937
(E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002)).
175
Id. at 302.
176
Id. at 303–04. The court specifically referred to 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1997) (currently
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2003)) in its analysis.
177
See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
178
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
179
See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (“Without it, a cause of action
does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a
policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”) (quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 290–
91).
180
Id. (citing Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286–87).
181
See id at 304.
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Creppy Directive is not narrowly tailored to overcome that
presumption.182 Significantly, in N. Jersey Media the court’s
holding expanded upon the Detroit Free Press court’s holding
because it imposed an injunction nationally, rather than on a
specific special interest proceeding.
The optimism of the media plaintiffs waned after the victory in
New Jersey because the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s
decision, pending a decision in the Third Circuit.183 Although the
Court provided no rationale for its stay,184 it seems likely that
Attorney General Ashcroft’s order that altered the CFR, issued on
May 28, 2002,185 played an influential role. The U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey published its opinion on the
same day that the order was issued, but the Attorney General
retroactively dated the order to May 21.186
5. The Sixth Circuit Affirms, Bestowing upon the Public a
Qualified Right to Access Haddad’s Hearings
Despite the setback for media plaintiffs in the North Jersey
Media case, the Sixth Circuit soon affirmed the earlier decision of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in
Detroit Free Press. Although the court looked anew at the
questions of law,187 it enjoined use of special interest procedures as
182

The court assessed each of the four factors required for an injunction, based upon
Allegheny Energy Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999), and found that the
plaintiffs’ claim satisfied all of them. Id. at 304–05.
183
Ashcroft v. N. Jersey Media Group, 536 U.S. 954 (2002) (mem.).
184
The Supreme Court issued a brief statement in issuing its stay of the injunction,
pending the outcome of the appeal to the Third Circuit:
Application for stay presented to Justice SOUTER and by him referred to the
Court granted, and it is ordered that the preliminary injunction entered by the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on May 28, 2002, is
stayed pending the final disposition of the government’s appeal of that
injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Id.
185
Att’y Gen. Order No. 2585-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799 (May 28, 2002).
186
Id.
187
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 685 (6th Cir. 2002) (“We review the
grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion, but questions of law are
reviewed de novo.”) (quoting Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625
(6th Cir. 2000)).
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they applied to Haddad.188 Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit
framed its analysis on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment query and
decided first that the Richmond Newspapers test applied.189 The
Sixth Circuit next employed the experience and logic analysis in
which the court established the existence of a qualified public
access right.190 Finally, the Sixth Circuit determined that the
Creppy Directive lacked the narrow tailoring necessary to
overcome the access right.191 This analysis is distinguished from
the analysis used in Detroit Free Press, which granted equal
weight to the First Amendment query and the express language of
the CFR.
In structuring its analysis, the Sixth Circuit initially determined
that access to removal proceedings should be evaluated under
Richmond Newspapers, and that such proceedings must operate
under presumptive openness if they satisfy the experience and
logic prongs.192 After considering the government’s contention
that the Richmond Newspapers test pertains only to judicial branch
criminal proceedings,193 the court concluded that Richmond
Newspapers applied because courts have applied the test in other
contexts194 and because the government produced no case law
188

Id. at 681.
Id. at 696.
190
Id. at 700.
191
Id. at 711.
192
Id. at 696, 700.
193
The court initially considered the government’s contention that the Kleindienst
standard should apply to removal proceedings generally because of the government’s
plenary powers. Yet the Sixth Circuit followed its own district court and the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey in declaring that Kleindienst did not apply to
removal proceedings because of due process implications. The court noted, “It would be
ironic, indeed, to allow the government’s assertion of plenary power to transform the
First Amendment from the great instrument of open democracy to a safe harbor from
public scrutiny.” Id. at 686.
194
Like the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, the Sixth Circuit cited
examples of cases outside of the criminal context in which courts applied the Richmond
Newspapers test. They include:
United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002) (university’s
student disciplinary board proceedings); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177–79 (6th Cir. 1983) (civil action
against administrative agency); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059
(3d Cir. 1984) (civil trial); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d
189
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supporting its premise.195 Moreover, the court highlighted close
similarities between removal proceedings and criminal
proceedings—the latter representing the context in which the
Supreme Court applied the Richmond Newspapers test.196
Specifically, the court emphasized the quasi-judicial structure of
removal proceedings, including the Notice that initiates
proceedings and the government’s burden of presenting clear and
convincing evidence.197
After determining that the Richmond Newspapers test applied,
the Sixth Circuit turned its attention to the experience prong,
finding that removal proceedings historically have operated under
a presumption of openness.198 The court observed that the
Supreme Court requires a period of established routine to fulfill the
experience criterion, but does not require centuries of tradition.199
Turning to the specific history of removal proceedings, the court
decided that the CFR has “explicitly required deportation
proceedings to be presumptively open” for more than thirty years,
and that Congress has revised the INA more than fifty times
without “indicating that [the executive branch] had judged their
intent incorrectly.”200 Moreover, Congress has enacted statutes

177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (municipal planning meeting); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S.
Dept. of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (agriculture department’s
voters list); Soc’y of Prof. Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574
(D. Utah 1985) (administrative hearing), vacated as moot, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th
Cir. 1987).
Id. at 695.
The court also added that in a Richmond Newspapers concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens wrote, “[t]he First Amendment protects the public and the press from
abridgement of their rights of access to information about the operation of their
government, including the Judicial Branch.”) (emphasis added). Id.
195
Id. at 695.
196
Id. at 698.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 700–03.
199
Id. at 700. The court stated that in Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court strictly
relied on “post-Bill of Rights history in determining that preliminary hearings in criminal
cases were historically open.” Id. The court also mentioned that several circuit courts
have labeled procedures as presumptively open even if they lack the historical openness
that would satisfy the Richmond Newspapers experience prong. Id. at 700.
200
Id. at 701.
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that have kept exclusion hearings closed.201 The court also noted
that while removal proceedings have operated openly for
approximately thirty years within the modern administrative state,
open proceedings also existed in the common law’s closest
analog.202
The Sixth Circuit next examined the Richmond Newspapers
logic prong and found that removal proceedings satisfied this
requirement as well. The court asserted that “public access acts as
a check on the actions of the Executive by assuring us that
proceedings are conducted fairly and properly,”203 and that it
encourages scrutiny so that government “does not make
mistakes.”204 The court added that because the government does
not guarantee counsel for respondents in removal proceedings, the
press and public “may be [the aliens’] only guardian[s].”205 The
court also found that open hearings “may assure the public that
justice has been done,” and that they enhance the likelihood that
the government will abide by established procedures.206 Finally,
the court asserted that public access keeps the American citizenry
informed about the affairs of its government so that it can “affirm
or protest” its efforts.207
After determining that the removal proceedings satisfied the
two prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test, the court concluded
that the Creppy Directive, and the order that modified it,
collectively lacked narrow tailoring to fulfill a compelling
governmental interest.208 In turn, this prevented the government
from overcoming the presumption of openness that Richmond
Newspapers mandates.209 Unlike the U.S. District Court for the
201

See id. (discussing statutory enactments from the Nineteenth Century).
Id. at 702. In a procedure dating to the Eighteenth Century, England’s open criminal
courts banished individuals to the American Colonies, among other destinations. Id.
203
Id. at 703–04.
204
Id. at 704.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 707–10.
209
Id. at 710. The court also argued that, irrespective of strict scrutiny concerns, the
Creppy Directive could not fit within an exception to the Richmond Newspapers test
because it does not require the immigration judge to make specific, on-the-record
202
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Eastern District of Michigan, the Sixth Circuit held that the
government presented a compelling governmental interest
“sufficient to justify closure.”210
Despite this, the court found that the Creppy Directive failed to
exhibit narrow tailoring because of both under-breadth and overbreadth. This means that parts of Creppy Directive allowed the
government more latitude than necessary to fulfill its compelling
objective, while other aspects of it were not sufficiently inclusive
in this regard.211 As for under-breadth, the Sixth Circuit echoed
the lower court by underscoring the ability of respondents and
attorneys to comment on their trials outside the courtroom.212 The
court acknowledged that the Attorney General had crafted his
order to solve this matter, but argued that the proposed solution
impermissibly restrained speech.213 The court stated that, “these
prohibitions are impermissible to the extent that they indefinitely
restrain a deportee’s ability to divulge all information, including
information obtained independently from the deportation
proceedings.”214 As a result, the court construed the regulations as
binding on attorneys and respondents only during the duration of
their removal proceedings.215
Regarding the Creppy Directive’s over-breadth, the court stated
that an immigration judge could make case-by-case determinations
to avoid the blanket closure that the Creppy Directive mandates.216

findings to justify the closure of an immigration court—and the court determined that
Press-Enterprise II insists on such procedure. See id. at 707 (citing Press-Enterprise II,
478 U.S. 1 (1986)).
210
Id. at 705–06. The court cited, among other issues, the mosaic theory that the
Attorney General had emphasized in the order that codified the Creppy Directive. Id.
211
Id. at 710.
212
Id. at 707–08.
213
Id.
214
See id. at 708 (noting that it violates the First Amendment to bar a witness from
revealing his own testimony after a grand jury concludes) (citing Butterworth v. Smith,
494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990). The court also found the order improper because it restricts
dissemination of respondents’ names, the locations of their arrests, and dates of their
arrests—information unrelated to their actual proceedings. Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. Although the Court does not directly address the ways in which 8 C.F.R. §
1003.46 (2003) affects the discretion of immigration judges to close their own courts on
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The court also observed that, to remove an alien, the government
typically does not require presentation of evidence related to
national security.217 In Haddad’s case, the government sought
removal merely because Haddad overstayed his tourist visa.218
The court added that, just because the mosaic theory provided the
government with a compelling interest, logic required an
immigration judge to make specific findings. To do otherwise
could lead the government to close any public hearing, including
criminal judicial proceedings protected by Richmond
Newspapers.219 As a result, the court proscribed enforcement of
the special interest procedures that barred the press from Haddad’s
removal hearings.220
6. Despite the Sixth Circuit’s Decision in Favor of Media
Interests, Haddad’s Hearings Have Remained Closed
Press plaintiffs secured another victory for public access
because the government did not convince the Sixth Circuit that the
Creppy Directive fit the strict scrutiny exception under the
Richmond Newspapers test; nevertheless, they celebrated only
briefly because Haddad’s hearings were closed again. Following
the Sixth Circuit’s affirmation of the district court’s injunction,
Haddad sought and secured a preliminary injunction requiring a
new removal hearing that would be presumptively open to the

case-by-case bases, it seems evident that the court approves only of a case-by-case model
that fully empowers immigration judges.
217
Id. at 709.
218
Id. (“To deport an overstay, the INS must convince the immigration judge by clear
and convincing evidence that the alien was admitted as a non-immigrant for a specific
period, that the period has elapsed, and that the alien is still in this country.”) (citing
Shahla v. Immigration and Nationalization Serv., 749 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1984)).
219
Id. at 709–10. The court observed that logical extension of the mosaic theory
argument would lead even to closed criminal proceedings in judicial courts, which would
result in “wholesale suspension of First Amendment rights.” Id.
220
Id. at 683. The court suggested that the special interest policy would “uproot
people’s lives, outside the public eye, and behind a closed door. Democracies die behind
closed doors.” Moreover, it emphasized that the public “deputiz[es] the press as the
guardians of their liberty.” Id.
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public.221
Immigration Judge Robert Newberry replaced
Immigration Judge Elizabeth Hacker, Haddad’s former
immigration judge in subsequent proceedings.222
Yet, when Judge Newberry commenced Haddad’s proceeding
on October 1, 2002, he closed the doors of his immigration court
without providing an on-the-record rationale.223 During a closed
meeting held the morning before the hearing, Judge Newberry
reviewed the information the government had sought to introduce
and opted for closure at that time.224 Media plaintiffs immediately
sought relief from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan.225 The court held that Judge Newberry had the right to
close the proceeding, but that he had violated the procedure
designated by the Sixth Circuit because he did not allow Haddad’s
counsel to challenge the closure, nor did he render particularized
on-the-record findings.226 As a result, the district court held that
the immigration court must follow the Sixth Circuit’s procedure in
the future, but that Judge Newberry had properly closed the
courtroom on October 1, because of the sensitive evidence that the
government had introduced.227
221
See Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich.) (holding that denial of a
hearing before a new immigration judge would undermine Haddad’s due process rights),
aff’d sub nom. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
222
Steve Fainaru, Detainee to Get Open Immigration Hearing; Justice Department Still
Plans Appeal of Ruling for Muslim Activist Held 9 Months, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2002,
at A13.
223
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-70339, 2002 WL 31317398, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 7, 2002).
224
Id. The parties’ briefs do not make clear whether Haddad’s counsel also attended
this meeting. Id at *1 n.1.
225
Detroit Free Press, 2002 WL 31317398, at *1.
226
Id.
227
Id. at *1–*2. The prohibition on special interest tactics remains intact in the Sixth
Circuit. In January, the Sixth Circuit denied the government’s request for a rehearing of
its case, as well as its request for a rehearing en banc. See O’Connor & Bush, supra note
115, at N15.
Despite the Sixth Circuit’s clear opposition to the special interest procedures,
Haddad’s case apparently is not the only one in the Sixth Circuit that has been
categorically closed to the public in spite of the court’s decision last August. Ziad Anton
Hatter, a 31-year-old Jordanian, was detained in Ohio last year, at the request of the INS,
without being charged. Hatter entered the country using false travel documents, and all
of his immigration proceedings, as of Jan. 21, 2003, have been closed to the public.
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As of this publication, Haddad’s case remains unresolved.
Judge Newberry recently denied Haddad’s asylum request and
ordered the removal of Haddad, his wife, and three of his four
children.228 Haddad is appealing the decision to the BIA,229 but
has remained jailed during this process.230
7. The Third Circuit Deals the Media Plaintiffs Another
Defeat
The Third Circuit also considered the question of access to
removal proceedings, but, unlike the Sixth Circuit, the court
declined to follow its lower court and instead permitted
enforcement of the Creppy Directive.231 The court concluded that
while the Richmond Newspapers test applies to removal
proceedings as a means of determining rights of public access,232
removal proceedings fail the test’s experience and logic prongs.233
As a result, the court did not find a presumptive right of access,
which led it to determine that First Amendment considerations
would play no role in its decision to overturn the nationwide
injunction on the Creppy Directive.234
First, the Third Circuit followed the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey and found that the Richmond Newspapers
test extends beyond criminal proceedings to include removal
proceedings. Significantly, the court cited use of Richmond
Hatter remained in INS custody as of Jan. 21, 2003. See Bill Sloat, Detained; Jordanian
at Center of Dispute—Case Is Now a Fight on Post-9/11 Policy, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Jan 22, 2003, at A6.
228
David Shepardson, Islamic Charity Founder Pleads for Political Asylum; U.S. Has
Yet to Charge Haddad in Terror Link, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 21, 2002, at 1C. Orders of
removal can extend, as in Haddad’s case, to alien family members. Three of Haddad’s
children are aliens, while the fourth is American and cannot be removed. Id.
229
See Associated Press, Islamic Charity Chief Fights Deportation; Lebanese Citizen Is
Being Held on Visa Violation, Dec. 27, 2002, at 7.
230
See id.
231
See N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 204–09 (3d Cir. 2002).
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit majority failed to address the Attorney
General’s order. Thus, the opinion dealt only with the Creppy Directive.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 202.
234
Id. at 220–21.
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Newspapers in civil proceedings,235 and in the administrative
context.236 The Third Circuit concluded that, these “precedents
demonstrate that in this [c]ourt, Richmond Newspapers is a test
broadly applicable to issues of access to government proceedings,
including removal.”237
Once the Third Circuit committed to a Richmond Newspapers
analysis, the court concluded that removal proceedings failed the
history prong because they have not been traditionally accessible
to the public.238 The court emphasized that Congress never passed
statutory language requiring public access to removal
proceedings,239 even if executive branch regulations have afforded
a rebuttable presumption of access since 1964.240 The court stated
that, “by insisting on a strong tradition of public access in the
Richmond Newspapers test, we preserve administrative flexibility
and avoid constitutionalizing ambiguous, and potentially
unconsidered, executive decisions.”241
The court also concluded that removal proceedings failed to
satisfy the standards of the Richmond Newspapers logic prong
because of the risks in publicizing information that the government
deems special interest.242 The court pronounced that the logic
prong required it “to consider whether public access plays a
235

The court cited Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984), in
which the Third Circuit extended the First Amendment right of access to civil trials. Id. at
207–08.
236
Id. at 208. As an example, the court illustrated that in Capital Cities Media, Inc. v.
Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit had applied the Richmond
Newspapers test to determine whether the press could access an administrative agency’s
records. Id.
237
Id. at 208–09.
238
Id. at 211 (“[T]he tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and
inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.”).
239
Id. at 213 (stating that “we are unwilling effectively to craft a constitutional right
from mere Congressional silence”).
240
Id. at 201. The court argued further that, even if a rebuttable presumption alone were
sufficient to fulfill the Richmond Newspapers history prong, the rebuttable presumption
in removal proceedings has not always been maintained. Removal proceedings have
taken place frequently in closed settings such as prisons, hospitals and private homes,
without an initial expectation of public access. Id. at 212.
241
Id. at 216.
242
Id. at 216–20.
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significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process
in question.”243 Although the circuit court recognized that the
district court had addressed safety concerns within its strict
scrutiny analysis, the circuit court found it more appropriate to
incorporate such issues in a logic prong analysis.244
The Third Circuit found that the mosaic theory, on its own,
provided a significant reason to close removal proceedings.245 As
a result, the “Third Circuit concluded that it was in the
government’s best interest not to know what was happening in the
closed proceedings due to the national security concerns.”246
Moreover, although the court acknowledged that it could only
speculate that closure would prevent terrorist attacks, the court
asserted that “courts have traditionally extended great deference to
Executive expertise” when handling national security matters.247
Because the circuit court concluded that removal proceedings
failed to satisfy the Richmond Newspapers test, it overturned the
injunction instituted by the district court.248
8. The Dissent Argued that Richmond Newspapers Dictates a
Qualified Right of Public Access to Removal Proceedings
Although the Third Circuit confirmed that the government
could employ the Creppy Directive, Judge Anthony J. Scirica
dissented from his two colleagues in the majority because he
thought they mishandled the Richmond Newspapers test.249 In his
dissent, Judge Scirica found that removal proceedings satisfied the

243

Id. at 216 (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 216–17.
245
Id. at 217–19.
246
Eve Burton, Access to Special Interest Deportation Proceedings, MEDIA L. RES.
CENT. BULL., Jan. 2003, at 55, 64.
247
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 219.
248
Id. at 221 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Significantly, the court confined application of its
decision to those cases the DOJ labels as special interest, although its analysis under the
Richmond Newspapers test pertained to removal proceedings generally. Id. at 220
(Scirica, J., dissenting). Because the court did not find an access right, it saw no reason
to consider whether the Creppy Directive satisfied strict scrutiny, or whether the lower
court had overstepped its bounds by instituting a nationwide injunction.
249
Id. at 221 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
244
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Richmond Newspapers test,250 and that the Creppy Directive
lacked the required narrow tailoring to overcome the existing
presumption of public access.251
First, Judge Scirica insisted that his colleagues had been too
demanding in their application of the Richmond Newspapers
experience prong, and that in reality, open removal proceedings
have strong roots.252 Like his colleagues, Judge Scirica conceded
that Congress had not explicitly opened deportation proceedings.253
Nevertheless, Judge Scirica stated that deportation hearings have
been presumptively open for a century254 and that the DOJ
incorporated this presumption of openness into the CFR in 1964.255
He added that because Richmond Newspapers only demanded “a
qualified right of access . . . which may be restricted by a
countervailing public interest,”256 the history of removal
proceedings has demonstrated openness sufficient to satisfy the
Richmond Newspapers experience prong.257
Judge Scirica distinguished his analysis of the logic prong from
that of his colleagues because he thought they had unreasonably
limited their consideration to special interest circumstances, rather
than those that pertain to removal proceedings generally.258 “The
logic analysis set forth by the Supreme Court is directed at a
particular structural type of proceeding—in this case, deportation
hearings—not a subset based on specific designations such as
terrorism.”259 Judge Scirica conceded that if the logic prong
focused solely on special interest cases, then security concerns
250

Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
Id. at 228 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Like the majority, Judge Scirica failed to consider
the impact of the Attorney General’s order in his analysis.
252
Id. at 222 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
253
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
254
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
255
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
256
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
257
Id. at 224 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica noted that “this century of unbroken
openness, especially within the nascent tradition of the administrative state, ‘implies the
favorable judgment of experience’ under the Richmond Newspapers test.” Id. (Scirica, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
258
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
259
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
251
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would outweigh public access rights.260 He argued, however, that
the Richmond Newspapers test requires a court to consider the
whole proceeding when contemplating logic, and in this broader
light, removal proceedings satisfied the logic prong.261
After concluding that removal proceedings operated under a
qualified First Amendment right of access, Judge Scirica followed
the district court and would have overturned the Creppy
Directive.262 Like the majority, Judge Scirica found that the
district court had unreasonably dismissed the compelling
governmental objective of national security.263 Nevertheless, he
determined that the Creppy Directive’s “blanket closure rule”
removed decision-making powers from immigration judges who
could make case-by-case judgments instead—even on issues
pertinent to national security.264
Although Judge Scirica could not convince his fellow panelists
to follow his logic in the Third Circuit’s holding, media plaintiffs
had hoped that, upon reevaluation, the court would reinstitute the
injunction imposed by the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey.265 The ACLU, representing the North Jersey Media
Group and the New Jersey Law Journal, filed a petition on
260

Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica clarified:
At this stage, we must consider the value of openness in deportation hearings
generally, not its benefits and detriments in “special interest” deportation cases
in particular. If a qualified right of access is found to attach to deportation
hearings generally, the analysis then turns to whether particular issues raised in
individual cases override the general limited right of access.
Id. at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
261
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
262
Id. at 228–29 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica remarked, however, that he
would have limited the injunction to the newspaper plaintiffs rather than follow the lower
court and apply it nationwide, and that expanding it more broadly constituted an abuse of
discretion.
263
Id. at 226 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
264
Id. at 228 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica asserted that if immigration judges
afford due deference to INS counsel, immigration judges still can close proceedings that
involve sensitive information. To convince immigration judges that they should close
proceedings, government counselors are free to raise the mosaic theory or any other
arguments they might consider persuasive. Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
265
See Kibret Markos, U.S. Court Asked to Reconsider Secret Deportation Hearings,
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Nov. 23, 2002, at A6.
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November 22, 2002 with the Third Circuit, seeking
reconsideration.266 The ACLU claimed that the Third Circuit’s
decision conflicted with previous holdings of the Supreme Court,
as well as with the Sixth Circuit’s decision.267 On December 4,
2002, however, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ motion.268
III.
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SPECIAL INTEREST POLICY
MUST BE OVERTURNED IN FAVOR OF A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH
A. The Fairest Solution
The restoration of case-by-case decision-making powers to
immigration judges would most equitably resolve the dispute
between the government and the press concerning the special
interest policy.269 The government should be compelled to
demonstrate that there are specific reasons for its actions, rather
than relying on “conclusory, vague and general” statements.270
The special interest policy deeply undermines the balance between
the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the press to disseminate
information on the public’s behalf271 and the government’s interest
266

See id.
See Scott Fallon, Court Snubs ACLU on Secret Hearings; Rejects Petition for Sept.
11 Detainees, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Dec. 5, 2002, at A10.
268
Id. According to Deborah Jacobs, executive director of the ACLU of New Jersey, “It
wasn’t the outcome we asked for, but we still have the high court.” Id.
269
Eve Burton, supra note 246, at 55. Ms. Burton has supported this outcome, as well,
noting that “while [it] may be tedious for the government and resource intensive for the
press, it is the right mandate for a country that has respect for both national security and
the right of the press and public to know about its government’s activities.” Id.
Attorney Paul Smith of Jenner & Block echoed Burton’s sentiment, noting that:
Some guy in Washington just is checking cases on a list and . . . we don’t get to
have any inquiry into how that decision was made. . . . [W]e ought to insist on
the principle that the government has to make a case to some person who looks
like a judge in each individual case—not just come in and have a blanket
closure policy for hundreds of different proceedings.
Symposium, MLRC Roundtable—Defending Access Post 9/11: Responding to the
National Security Challenge, MEDIA L. RES. CENT. BULL., Jan. 2003, at 1 [hereinafter
MLRC Roundtable].
270
See id. at 25 (quoting Lee Gelernt, Esq., of the ACLU).
271
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 26 (stating that “this is an important public
event that ought to be visible to people”). Attorney Floyd Abrams of Cahill Gordon and
267
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in protecting the nation from security threats. The special interest
measures skewed this relationship impermissibly in favor of the
government by creating a categorical policy that intentionally
excludes the press from courtrooms handling special interest
respondents.272
The case-by-case approach clearly finds
constitutional support273 by meeting the demands of the Richmond
Newspapers test.274 When the test applies to a given proceeding, it
affords the press with qualified courtroom access that cannot be
undermined unless the government exhibits a compelling objective
that it can fulfill through a narrowly tailored policy.275
B. The Media Enjoys a Constitutionally Supported Qualified
Access Right to Removal Proceedings
Crucially, each of the courts that considered press access to
removal proceedings supported employment of the Richmond
Newspapers test to evaluate the press plaintiffs’ contentions.276
The courts disagreed only in their analysis of the experience and
logic prongs, with three of the four siding in favor of the
plaintiffs.277 There is little doubt, however, that the Third Circuit
Reindel added that, “one needs to press this theme of the press as a sort of lonely check
on governmental abuse.” Id.
272
See Creppy Directive, supra note 2, with its specific bar on press attendance in
courtrooms employing special interest procedures.
273
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 692–93 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey
Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301–02 (D.N.J.) (finding constitutional
support for an outcome that preserves the right of immigration judges to make case-bycase determinations), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
274
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692–93; N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at
301–02.
275
See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1986) (formalizing the parameters of the
Richmond Newspapers experience and logic test and the accompanying presumption of
access if a proceeding satisfies each of the prongs).
276
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696; N. Jersey Media Group,
205 F. Supp. 2d at 300; N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2002)
(confirming that press access to courtrooms is a First Amendment question decided under
the Richmond Newspapers standard).
277
See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 947; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710;
N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 305 (siding with press plaintiffs). But see N.
Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 220–21 (siding in favor of the government’s special
interest policy).
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misapplied the Richmond Newspapers standard to the facts before
it.278 As Judge Scirica articulated in his opinion dissenting from
the Third Circuit majority,279 the majority unevenly applied both
the experience and logic prongs. Judge Scirica noted that the
majority undersold an established history of openness that satisfied
the experience prong,280 and mistreated perceived risks to national
security, when it evaluated the logic and barred qualified access to
a removal proceeding.281
To support his contention that removal proceedings satisfied
the Richmond Newspapers experience prong, Judge Scirica
questioned whether the majority had inappropriately distinguished
between judicial branch criminal proceedings and matters such as
social security hearings. The latter, he stated, had a long-standing
tradition of closure.282 Judge Scirica asserted that removal
proceedings possess great similarity to judicial branch proceedings
because they are adjudicatory; social security hearings, on the
other hand, adopt an inquisitorial model.283
278

As ACLU attorney Lee Gelernt stated:
I agree that the Third Circuit’s approach on the logic prong was wrong because
the logic prong looks at whether openness would be beneficial to the general
process at issue, here the deportation proceeding, and not at whether there may
be reasons to close portions of hearings in particular cases or subsets of cases,
such as national security cases, to protect against the disclosure of substantive
information.
Id. at 25.
279
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221.
280
Id. at 222–24 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
281
See id. at 219 (“To the extent that the Attorney General’s national security concerns
seem credible, we [the majority] will not lightly second-guess them.”).
282
Id. at 223–34 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
283
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). According to Judge Scirica:
Social Security benefits claim proceedings are distinguishable. They “are
inquisitorial rather than adversarial,” in that the Administrative Law Judge
undertakes multiple roles as the investigator, counselor, and adjudicator. Sims
v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110–11 (2000). The Supreme Court has identified the
differences between Social Security claims and other administrative
proceedings:
The differences between courts and agencies are nowhere more pronounced
than in Social Security proceedings. Although many agency systems of
adjudication are based to a significant extent on the judicial model of
decisionmaking, the SSA is perhaps the best example of an agency that is not.
Id. at 110 (internal quotations omitted).
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Judge Scirica emphasized that the majority’s logic calculus
should not have been limited to an examination of special interest
removal proceedings, but instead should have evaluated removal
proceedings generally.284
Once Judge Scirica made this
distinction, he found logic in maintaining a qualified openness for
removal proceedings. He said that if removal proceedings
pertained only to potential national security concerns, he would
close them as well.285 Yet, because they typically do not implicate
security concerns, and instead address issues such as a
respondent’s alleged “marriage fraud, moral turpitude convictions,
and aggravated felonies,” Judge Scirica thought logic compelled
qualified openness.286
Thus, Judge Scirica implicitly
acknowledged the liberty interests at stake in removal proceedings,
and the consequent importance of the press’s observational role.
C. A Case-by-Case Approach to Courtroom Access, Rather Than
the Special Interest Policy, Satisfies Strict Scrutiny
1. No Compelling Governmental Objective
Because little doubt exists that removal proceedings meet the
experience and logic prongs, the government can overcome the
press’s presumed access right only if it satisfies strict scrutiny by
presenting a compelling objective and a matching narrowly
tailored provision.287 Blanket closure of removal proceedings fails
both portions of this test.

Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
284
Id. at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
285
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).
286
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). Mr. Gelernt echoed, “What the Third Circuit did, I think,
was impermissibly side-step strict scrutiny. It may be that there are reasons to close
particular cases but that should not negate a general right of access to a particular type of
proceeding.” MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 25.
287
According to Mr. Gelernt, “once there is a general right of access to a type of
proceeding, the government should have to meet strict scrutiny to overcome the qualified
First Amendment right.” Professor Cole added, “strict scrutiny almost implies it’s got to
be done in an individual case by case basis, rather than the categorical cases.” MLRC
Roundtable, supra note 269, at 25.
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If the government’s interest is framed as an effort to prevent
acts of terror within its borders—the generalized approach adopted
by the Sixth Circuit288—it seems unreasonable to question whether
the government’s interests rises to a compelling level.289 If one
follows the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey’s
approach, however, and divides the compelling interest into more
specific components, the government’s interest lacks the same
forcefulness. In the New Jersey case, the court separated the
government’s compelling interest in two subcategories: “(1)
avoidance of setbacks to its terrorism investigation caused by open
hearings; and (2) prevention of stigma or harm to detainees that
might result if hearings were open.”290 Although the New Jersey
district court did not state definitively whether either prong should
be categorized as compelling,291 its commentary implied distrust of
both of them.292 Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan293 and various scholars have explicitly echoed
such sentiment.
Those who question that open hearings alone constitute a
reason for closure often point to the purely speculative nature of
the mosaic theory.294 Numerous measures to prevent disclosure of
information have, over time, proven misguided, including
America’s now-derided decision295 to control Japanese Americans

288

See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that
“the Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism”).
289
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 946–47 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d,
303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (questioning whether the government’s interest was
compelling).
290
N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 308
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). The first prong the court highlighted pertains to the mosaic
theory, and the government’s fear that information publicized from the hearings could
unwittingly aid terrorists. The second prong refers to the government’s argument that
open hearings would harm respondents by stigmatizing them unnecessarily.
291
Id. at 301–02.
292
Id.
293
Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47.
294
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 39 (“While yes, we definitely have to protect
national security,” said Attorney Laura Handman of Davis Wright Tremaine, “we need to
have some evidence that disclosure will harm national security.”).
295
See id. (quoting Professor Cole).
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during World War II by placing them in internment camps.296 The
Palmer Raids of 1920 serve as another cautionary tale.297 There,
the government arrested nearly 4,000 individuals with alleged antiAmerican affiliations,298 relying on tactics considered
constitutionally inappropriate in retrospect.299 Similarly, despite
the glowing praise that most historians bestow on President
Abraham Lincoln, there exists widespread disapproval of Lincoln’s
decision to suspend habeas corpus during the Civil War in order to
silence critics of the tottering Union.300
Others have stressed that efforts to prevent disclosure by
closing hearings undermine the press freedoms that America’s
Founding Fathers codified in the Bill of Rights.301 They argue that
as a direct consequence of the limitations on press access, detained
aliens have lacked their constitutionally-protected vehicle to share
stories about the special interest process.302 As such, these critics
have questioned whether other detainees have been treated like
Hady Hassan Omar, without public knowledge.303

296

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (confirming the
constitutionality of this policy).
297
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 51.
298
According to historian Allan Levine:
[O]n the evening of Jan. 2, 1920, hundreds of agents from the U.S. Bureau of
Investigation (it became the FBI in 1935), assisted by local police and
volunteers from the American Legion, swarmed across much of the United
States to arrest nearly 4,000 suspected radicals, Communists, Bolsheviks,
anarchists and “aliens.” Without proper arrest or search warrants in their
possession, the agents invaded political party headquarters, private homes, even
bowling alleys. Many of those arrested were beaten, herded into crowded,
unsanitary detention centres, and not allowed to communicate with their
families or lawyers for weeks.
Allan Levine, Return of the Red Scare, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 2, 2003, at A15.
299
Id.
300
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 22. Intriguingly, Handman indicates that
Congress compelled President Lincoln to publicize the names of those individuals being
detained during the suspension of habeas corpus. Id. at 22. The special interest policy, on
the other hand, makes no such concession. See Creppy Directive, supra note 2.
301
Id. at 22.
302
See id. (referring to Hady Hassan Omar’s plight, as chronicled in Brzezinski, supra
note 91, at 50).
303
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 38. According to Handman, “[w]hen they are
detaining people and depriving them of their liberty, the public needs to know, has a right
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As for the second governmental interest identified by the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey—the protection of
respondents’ identities304—the government’s mandate “does not
permit the individual to elect such protective treatment.”305 The
district court added that, “this interest is coextensive with the
individual’s preference to see it invoked, given that closure may be
seen by some detainees as having a negative impact upon them and
their interests.”306 In other words, the court argued that if a
respondent prefers to have press observing a proceeding, she
should have the personal liberty to make that choice.
2. No Narrow Tailoring
Even if one construes the government’s objectives as
compelling, the measures employed to fulfill them fail the narrow
tailoring requirement.307 Most of the arguments questioning the
tailoring—both from courts and from commentators—have cited
the Creppy Directive’s inability to prevent information with
mosaic theory implications from leaving the courtroom. As the
Sixth Circuit noted, even the Attorney General’s order cannot
constitutionally remedy this flaw.308 The order improperly limits
participants in special interest cases from speaking about matters
to know something about these important investigations done in their name. . . . Are
these detentions worth the price—the price in liberty?” Id.
Professor Cole believes the government had an interest other than the spread of
information in mind. “[I] think they wanted to use immigration authority to detain
people. . . . The fact that someone has overstayed his visa generally doesn’t authorize
detaining the person. It authorizes deporting them if [they are] not eligible for some sort
of benefit.” Id. at 40.
304
N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 308
F.3d 198 (3d. Cir 2002).
305
Id. at 301–02. The court addressed this second prong as part of its tailoring analysis,
but the question should have been assessed independently within an analysis of the
government’s interests. Id. The court, however, undertook no such effort. Id.
306
Id. at 302.
307
See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 709–10 (6th Cir. 2002)
(agreeing that the government’s efforts failed to meet the narrow tailoring requirement);
Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich.) (agreeing that the
government’s efforts failed to meet the narrow tailoring requirement), aff’d, 303 F.3d 681
(6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (agreeing that the
government’s efforts failed to meet the narrow tailoring requirement).
308
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 708.
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that are external to the proceedings, such as a respondent’s date
and place of arrest, as well as his name.309
The government’s efforts also lack narrow tailoring because
they would impact upon press rights at criminal proceedings, even
though Richmond Newspapers granted the press a qualified right of
access to such courtrooms.310 Specifically, if the government fully
applied the measures in the Creppy Directive intended to prevent
the spread of an information mosaic, the government would have
to utilize them in the cases of those held on purely criminal charges
after September 11.311 Because Richmond Newspapers protected a
qualified access right to criminal proceedings, however,
employment of the blanket policy to this extent would directly
contradict Supreme Court precedent.312 As a result, the Creppy
Directive exhibits constitutionally impermissible over-breadth.313
Others have critiqued the policy as overbroad because it may lead
to more questionable detentions like that of Hady Hassan
Omar’s—where the government eventually decided that it lacked
sufficient grounds to employ special interest tactics.314
D. Press as the Public’s Seeker of Truth
Because the government failed to define compelling interests
or a policy that exhibits suitably narrow tailoring, the special
interest process clearly fails the strict scrutiny test and lacks
constitutionality. As such, there was no reason to deviate from the
previously employed system of case-by-case closure, as compelled
by the Richmond Newspapers test. The case-by-case method more
evenly balances the concerns of the government and the press than
the special interest policy ever could. America differentiates itself
from more oppressive regimes by constitutionalizing the press’s
duty to observe matters of all sorts on the public’s behalf. Of
309

Id.
See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 23 (drawing from Professor Cole’s
commentary).
311
Id.
312
See id.
313
Cole noted that “[t]heir arguments prove too much.” Id. at 23.
314
See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 36; Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50.
310
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course, certain instances may exist when the government has
concretized reasons to fear that disclosure of information will
directly compromise the nation’s safety. Rather than deciding
arbitrarily that the government interests trump those equally
weighty concerns of the press, it is more appropriate for a judge to
balance the competing interests in each case and to make specific
determinations on closure as she sees fit.
It is possible, however, that an EOIR judge without a clear
understanding of the government’s national security scheme could
make an uninformed decision on closure. That is precisely why, in
each case, the government must present facts to such a judge in
order to make such a judge aware of special circumstances. At the
same time, the judge should have the opportunity to hear from
press representatives who can make First Amendment arguments
of their own. This system may lead to perceived inconsistency, of
course, as one case might remain open while another with
superficially similar facts would close. But that inconsistency is
only an illusion because each case presents unique circumstances.
A judge should rely on the discretion entrusted to her to make fair
and just decisions.
CONCLUSION: THE COURSE TO THE SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN SET
“The last chapter of this issue and these cases has yet to be
written.”315 Media interests have opted to challenge the Third
Circuit’s decision,316 and in May 2003, Supreme Court began to
consider whether to grant a writ of certiorari in order to determine
the constitutionality of the special interest policy.317 Although it
seems likely that the Supreme Court will grant a writ of certiorari
to resolve the split between the Third and Sixth Circuits, there
remains an “aura of unpredictability”318 regarding the case’s
315

Eve Burton, supra note 246, at 65.
Tony Mauro, Weighing Security Against Public Access: Justices to Consider
Newspapers’ Petition Challenging Closed Deportation Proceedings for ‘Special Interest’
Aliens, LEGAL TIMES, May 19, 2003, at 11.
317
Id.
318
Marcia Coyle, Immigration Issue Splits U.S. Courts: It’s Media v. U.S. on Closed
Hearings, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 2002, at A1. Ms. Burton cautions both the government
316

OBERFIELD FORMAT

1260

8/27/03 3:00 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1209

outcome. Therefore, “It’s going to take some very serious thinking
about how to count to five on this case in this court,”319 and
observers remain uncertain whether the special interest policy will
survive the Court’s scrutiny.320
The Court last evaluated a press access matter when it
sharpened the experience and logic test in its June 1986 PressEnterprise II decision.321 In that case, the Court held in favor of
press interests that had sought access to preliminary trial
proceedings.322 Since then, the Court’s membership has changed
dramatically: only Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice John
Paul Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor remain.323
Unfortunately, examination of the justices’ decisions in these
cases fails to make clear how these justices will respond to the
current press issue.
Justice Stevens wrote in Richmond
Newspapers that, “the First Amendment protects the public and
press from abridgement of their rights of access to information
about the operation of their government, including the judicial
branch.”324 This indicates that Justice Stevens might support the
application of First Amendment rights to the administrative
proceedings that have been closed by the special interest policy.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens dissented in both Globe Newspaper
v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk325 and PressEnterprise II,326 even though he concurred with the majority in
Press-Enterprise I.327
Chief Justice Rehnquist exhibited
inconsistency because he dissented in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
and press interests to “proceed carefully” because “both sides face uncertainties.” Eve
Burton, supra note 246, at 65.
319
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 32 (quoting Lee Levine, Esq., of Levine,
Sullivan, and Koch).
320
See Coyle, supra note 318, at A1.
321
See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
322
Id. at 2.
323
See Supreme Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Members of the
Supreme Court, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/about.html (last
visited May 13, 2003).
324
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980) (emphasis added).
325
457 U.S. 596, 620 (1982).
326
478 U.S. at 15.
327
464 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring).

OBERFIELD FORMAT

2003]

DOJ PROCEEDINGS INFRINGE PRESS LIBERTIES

8/27/03 3:00 PM

1261

v. Virginia,328 Globe Newspaper329 and Press-Enterprise II,330 but
he sided with the Press-Enterprise I majority.331 It seems possible
that Justice O’Connor would side with the current media plaintiffs
because she supported the media in Globe Newspaper,332 PressEnterprise I,333 and Press-Enterprise II.334 Still, Justice O’Connor
had not yet assumed her seat on the Court when it decided
Richmond Newspapers,335 so her record may not clearly indicate
how she will evaluate the current circuit split.
Some of the Court’s justices also might be swayed to alter the
Richmond Newspapers test because nearly twenty years have
elapsed since the last holding in the Richmond Newspapers line.
Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice O’Connor tend to avoid brightline tests like the Richmond Newspapers standard so they may opt
for a standard that reflects their preferred principles.336 Justice
Breyer, for one,337 might be more inclined to adopt a flexible
measure similar to the one he employed in his Bartnicki v.
Vopper338 concurring opinion.339
If the Court maintains the Richmond Newspapers standard in
its current form, however, the experience prong may be important
to Justice Clarence Thomas,340 who emphasized the importance of
328

448 U.S. at 604.
457 U.S. at 612.
330
478 U.S. at 15.
331
464 U.S. at 503.
332
457 U.S. at 611 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
333
464 U.S. at 503.
334
478 U.S. at 3.
335
448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980); see also supra note 323.
336
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 18 (“You have a number of justices on this
Court, Justice Breyer and Justice O’Connor foremost among them, who don’t like brightline tests.”).
337
See id. (highlighting Mr. Levine’s thoughts on Justice Breyer).
338
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
339
See id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring). Bartnicki pertained to statutory language that
affected the public broadcast of intercepted cellular telephone communication. In his
concurrence, Justice Breyer said that he “would ask whether the statutes strike a
reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing
consequences.” Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring).
340
See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 32 (quoting Mr. Levine’s statement that
Justice Thomas has a preference for history).
329
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historical context in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.341
Justice Breyer might treat the experience prong less rigidly.342
When Justice Breyer sat on the First Circuit, he signed onto a
majority decision343 that involved the Richmond Newspapers test
involving access to a bail hearing.344 “Essentially, the opinion
said, even though there is no history of access to bail proceedings,
that’s no problem.”345 Another case from his tenure on the First
Circuit, however, exposes an inconsistency in Breyer’s stance
toward the Richmond Newspapers test. Justice Breyer signed onto
a majority decision346 that questioned whether Richmond
Newspapers and its progeny extend beyond the criminal court
context.347
An argument that emphasizes the plenary power of Congress
over the executive branch also might play well before Justice
O’Connor, as well as Justice Anthony Kennedy. Because the court
cannot easily conduct substantive review of executive branch
activities in immigration and national security, it becomes “all the
more important” to allow journalists to observe removal
proceedings so that they can detail the procedures for the public’s
benefit.348 Otherwise, the executive branch would operate without
checks on its conduct.349 Nevertheless, the Court may refrain from
this approach for fear of interfering at all with Congress’s plenary
authority.350
341

514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court allowed a petitioner
to distribute anonymous leaflets regarding a proposed school tax, even though the action
violated Ohio state law. Justice Thomas asserted that the chief question in the case was
“whether the phrase ‘freedom of speech, or of the press,’ as originally understood,
protected anonymous political leafletting.” Id. at 359.
342
See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 19 (noting comments of David Schulz,
Esq., of Clifford Chance).
343
In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1984).
344
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 19.
345
Id. (quoting David Schulz).
346
El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez-Colon, 963 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1992).
347
MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 19.
348
See generally id. (referring to the comments of Professor Cole and Floyd Abrams,
Esq.).
349
Id.
350
See Coyle, supra note 318, at A1 (quoting Peter Shane, a legal scholar at CarnegieMellon University).
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Access to removal proceedings also may raise questions of law
that might not fit neatly into the Richmond Newspapers line
because the issue presents a rare juxtaposition of administrative
and First Amendment law.351 Because the Court has dealt only
with judicial branch proceedings in its previous holdings in the
Richmond Newspapers line352 rather than administrative
proceedings or other functions of the executive branch, the Court
might permit the special interest policy to continue.353 “If the
[C]ourt should be persuaded that there is a pervasive national
security problem with every single immigration case in this area,
we are going to lose the case and they will find the words for us to
lose it.”354
In the end, the Court may consider the security risks too great
to permit qualified public access.355 Such arguments convinced the
Third Circuit’s majority, and may continue to hold sway.356
History does not offer further guidance because the Court has
inconsistently treated challenges to executive branch tactics during
times of war. Will the Court follow the logic of Korematsu357 and
support the government’s contention that times of war require
limitations on liberty?358 Or will the Court follow the media351

According to Jan Ting, a professor of immigration and tax law at the Temple
University School of Law, “[m]y own feeling is this is almost unprecedented. . . . I’m just
unaware of a prior First Amendment access claim being made successfully in an
immigration case. I was very surprised by the 6th Circuit decision.” Id.
352
Expansion of the Richmond Newspapers test to contexts outside of judicial branch
proceedings has occurred only in Circuit and District Court decisions.
353
Professor Ting asked, “[i]f you’re going to allow a First Amendment right, where do
you draw a line? Why shouldn’t the New York Times be able to send a reporter into
cabinet meetings?” Coyle, supra note 318, at A1.
354
See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 26 (quoting Abrams).
355
Author Roger Parloff wrote, “[f]rom a judge’s perspective, the argument is
horrifyingly difficult to reject. The executive branch is saying to the judiciary: We can’t
be specific, and we know you may not understand, but you must trust us—otherwise, the
blood will be on your hands.” Roger Parloff, Dicta: Closed Doors, AM. LAW. 130 (2002).
356
Parloff then noted the effect of the government’s argument on Judge Morton
Greenberg, one of the two judges on the Third Circuit who comprised the majority in N.
Jersey Media Group. In oral arguments on Sept. 17, 2002, Judge Greenberg stated that,
“[w]e could make a decision here and people could die. Lots of people.” Id.
357
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
358
Id. at 219–220. In the case that confirmed the constitutionality of Japanese
American internment during World War II, the Court opined:
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supportive approach of New York Times v. United States,359 which
asserted the rights of the press to serve as the public’s sentry? In
due time, the Justices will let us know.

[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. All
citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or
lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and
in time of war the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large
groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.
But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by
hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened
danger.
Id. Although never overturned, Korematsu was denounced as an ill-advised venture “into
the ugly abyss of racism.” Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
359
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (preventing the government from imposing a prior restraint on
the press’s publication of confidential government documents it had secured from a third
party).

